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ABSTRACT 
Metamorphic computer virus employs various code mutation techniques to 
change its code to become new generations. These generations have similar behavior 
and functionality and yet, they could not be detected by most commercial antivirus 
because their solutions depend on a signature database and make use of string 
signature-based detection methods. However, the antivirus detection engine can be 
avoided by metamorphism techniques. The purpose of this study is to develop a 
performance model based on computer virus classification and detection. The model 
would also be able to examine portable executable files that would classify and 
detect metamorphic computer viruses. A Hidden Markov Model implemented on 
portable executable files was employed to classify and detect the metamorphic 
viruses. This proposed model that produce common virus statistical patterns was 
evaluated by comparing the results with previous related works and famous 
commercial antiviruses. This was done by investigating the metamorphic computer 
viruses and their features, and the existing classifications and detection methods. 
Specifically, this model was applied on binary format of portable executable files and 
it was able to classify if the files belonged to a virus family.  Besides that, the 
performance of the model, practically implemented and tested, was also evaluated 
based on detection rate and overall accuracy. The findings indicated that the 
proposed model is able to classify and detect the metamorphic virus variants in 
portable executable file format with a high average of 99.7% detection rate. The 
implementation of the model is proven useful and applicable for antivirus programs. 
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ABSTRAK 
Virus komputer metamorfik menggunakan pelbagai teknik mutasi kod untuk 
menukarkan kod menjadi generasi baru. Generasi ini mempunyai tingkah laku dan 
fungsi yang serupa namun tidak dapat dikesan oleh kebanyakan antivirus komersial 
kerana penyelesaian bergantung kepada pengkalan data yang menggunakan 
tandatangan dan menggunakan kaedah pengesanan berasaskan tandatangan-rentetan. 
Walau bagaimanapun, enjin pengesanan antivirus dapat dielakkan dengan teknik 
metamorfik. Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk membangunkan sebuah model prestasi 
berdasarkan klasifikasi virus komputer dan pengesanan. Model ini juga juga dapat 
mengenal pasti fail-fail boleh laksana mudah alih yang akan mengelaskan dan 
mengesan virus komputer metamorfik. Model Markov Tersembunyi digunakan pada 
fail-fail boleh laksana mudah alih untuk mengelaskan dan mengesan virus 
metamorfik. Model yang dicadangkan ini menghasilkan  bentuk statistik biasa yang 
dinilai dengan membandingkan keputusannya dengan hasil-hasil yang berkaitan 
dengan virus komersial yang terkenal sebelum ini. Ini dilakukan dengan menyelidiki 
virus komputer metamorfik dan ciri-cirinya dan pengelasan sedia ada serta kaedah 
pengesanan. Khususnya, model ini telah digunakan pada format binari fail-fail boleh 
laksana mudah alih dan mampu membuat klasifikasi jika fail-fail tergolong dalam 
keluarga virus. Selain itu, prestasi model, pelaksanaan secara praktikal dan diuji, juga 
dinilai berdasarkan kadar pengesanan dan ketepatan keseluruhan. Dapatan kajian 
menunjukkan bahawa model yang dicadangkan mampu untuk mengelaskan dan 
mengesan varian virus metamorfik fail-fail boleh laksana mudah alih dengan kadar 
purata pengesanan yang tinggi yakni 99.7%. Pelaksanaan model ini terbukti berguna 
dan boleh diaplikasikan untuk program-program antivirus. 
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  CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
These days, data are stored and shared in the digitally linked storage devices 
in the modern electronic world. The way we study, buy, play, work, earn money and 
live has become very different. The large majority of business transactions, which 
include extremely important and sensitive information, are performed via computers 
and over the digital networks and the internet. Therefore, it is imperative to care for 
information safety as a concern of dominant significance. Some digital applications, 
data processor and electronic storage devices, which can be connected through 
computer networks, are displayed in Figure 1.1.  
 
 Storage and Sharing of Information in Modern Digital World Figure 1.1
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Hence, we expose the safety and secrecy of private and personal information 
to danger in this way. We can see, even in this new kind of data storage and 
accessing system, information is even being stolen. We hear all the time, people‘s 
personal information and money are stolen. Even worse, malicious programs wipe 
out valuable information and wealth of companies and organizations. Because the 
current digital world comprises multi-faceted vulnerabilities, the important issue is to 
protect data from being damaged or removed by malware programs. The destruction 
induced by malicious codes is more dangerous in today‘s modern society, where 
personal and social communications and commercial business strongly depend on 
digital networks. In the latest study conducted by Symantec Corp., it is shown that 
the security is the top issue for 42 percent of organizations. In the past 12 months, 75 
percent of organizations have suffered from computer network attacks that cost the 
enterprise commerce an average of 2 million dollars yearly. The result of the study is 
presented in Figure 1.2 (Symantec, 2010). 
 
 Symantec Corp. Status of Enterprise Security in 2010: ―Most Figure 1.2
Significant Risks and Cyber Attacks in Last Year‖ (Symantec, 2010) 
 The security problem has contributed to the development of antivirus 
production and it is now practically mandatory for all computer users to have 
antivirus softwares on their personal computers. Nevertheless, we still hear much 
news on recent malware and cautions against them daily, so therefore we need to 
update database files of our antivirus software to stay away from corruption and 
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prevent wider proliferation of malware. The most important reason is that existing 
antivirus products mostly work based on byte-to-byte comparison of files, where 
binary string sequences extracted from the analyzed viral files are exploited as 
signatures (Wang et al., 2003; Zhang, 2008). If a given file contains corresponding 
signatures existed in the patterns database, then it is accepted as a viral program, 
Therefore, there is a weakness in finding previously non-accurately analyzed viruses 
(Mori, 2004; Xu et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, research and practical investigation in computer virology 
is still a contentious issue (Filiol et al., 2006; Marpaung et al., 2012). There is an 
extensively misconceived standpoint, which argues that research on computer virus 
and related areas not only is not productive, but also is potentially dangerous. The 
reason for this view is that the proponents of this opinion posit that it may lead to the 
growth of more overwhelming and harmful techniques of viral infection. They also 
believe that it is only waste of time, since fighting against the computer viruses is 
restricted to the found, analyze, extracted and identified signature of virus, the usual 
cycle of the antivirus software production (Filiol et al., 2006). 
For this reason, only a few research groups and laboratories in organizations 
and universities worldwide investigate malware and study computer virology 
(Bonfante et al., 2006). Lack of knowledge in this subject has resulted in small 
number of significant scientific findings in this field have been obtained for this 
belief, while a logical and accurate view on the problem shows that more researches 
and practical examinations on the issue of computer virology are really vital and 
crucial (Filiol et al., 2006; Mansfield-Devine, 2013). 
In order to protect our systems in an efficient way and predict computer 
malware risks before they practically appear as tools for attackers and virus creators, 
we need to profoundly, understand the threat we are facing (Mansfield-Devine, 
2013). 
As far as computer virology is concerned, unfortunately, there are several 
open problems remained unsolved, in aspects of modeling and implementation. 
Numerous new problems will certainly appear soon in the future, because of the 
progresses of malware creators. Whilst upcoming computer systems grow swiftly to 
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be complicated and sensitive, outdated defense and protection methods and models 
become even more inadequate (Filiol et al., 2006). 
When we deal with metamorphic viruses, the problem becomes even worse 
(Singhal and Raul, 2012). Metamorphic viruses propagate by creating new 
transformed instances of its code (Leder et al., 2009). In other words, for a signature-
based detector, metamorphic variants are considered as new viruses (Han et al., 
2011b). Metamorphic viruses are created, propagated and spread more and more, 
because with virus creation kits and automatic metamorphic engines it is not 
necessary to be an expert and spend much time to create new malware. 
Consequently, the time needed for analyzing and reverse engineering of viral codes 
to extract new signatures is even more prolonged, and the size of database is 
becoming bigger. 
In this study, a machine learning-based method, which uses an enhanced 
Hidden Markov Model is developed and implemented to analyze, classify and detect 
metamorphic computer viruses. This chapter concentrates on the background of the 
study, statement of the problem, research questions and objectives of the study. 
Then, the objectives of the research are presented, in more details. Next, the scope of 
the study, and in the last section, the significance of the research is explained. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
Early computer viruses were broadly spread in the 1980s, as a sequence of 
wide usage of personal computers and Microsoft‘s new operating system (Sanok Jr., 
2005; Makowsky, 2009). In late 1992, the reported number of malware spread in the 
cyber world was about 2,300 maximally, while this number reached to 60,000 known 
viruses until 2002, and in 2008, more than 100,000 computer viruses were detected 
and reported (Al Daoud et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the number of computer viruses 
and other varieties of malware are growing, tremendously.  
In today‘s digital world, although the reasons to create the new generations of 
computer viruses and malware programs have changed, we still hear about them in 
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digital news daily. There are new ways and causes, which motivate computer experts 
to work on new kinds of these programs, and consequently, information security 
researches should concentrate on this area to find the new methods to be able and to 
improve defensive systems against them. Computer networks, Internet and web-
based applications are the main streams in spreading such codes over the electronic 
world and they help virus authors to share their malware programs, computer by 
computer.  
To be safe from harms of various malicious codes, antivirus software 
producers utilize different methodologies to protect computer systems. They employ 
scanning methods to detect the file signature. Scanning methods usually consist of 
scanning email attachments, scanning downloaded files, and static file scanning. In 
addition, they make use of scanning by heuristic methods and General Decryption to 
fight against with modern and more complicated and advanced computer viruses 
(Sanok Jr., 2005). 
A computer virus is usually a part of a saved program, which when it is run is 
able to generate a duplication of itself in another saved program (Cohen, 1987; 
Agapow, 1993; Cohen and Cohen, 1994; Johansson, 1994; Colombell, 2002; Rajala, 
2004; Aycock, 2006; Khosrow Pour, 2007; Alsagoff, 2008). During the procedure of 
reproduction, virus can modify its code in many various methods. It is important to 
mention that the term ―virus‖ is sometimes incorrectly used to describe different 
kinds of computer malware. A genuine virus is able to replicate itself and spread 
from a computer to another, usually via different forms of executables, but this 
ability is not contained in other kinds of malware, such as worm, trojans, and 
spywares. In this report, these terms are employed. 
In computer virology, metamorphic code is a piece of program, which is able 
to rewrite itself with new format. Usually, it performs this action through converting 
its own program into a provisional version, revise this intermediate copy, and finally 
rewrite its code back to standard code, another time. This process is carried out on 
the virus by its own body, and consequently the metamorphic engine becomes 
different (Al Daoud et al., 2008). Some viruses use this approach while they are 
infecting new victims; as a result, the offspring are never similar to its original 
producer. Actually, this technique is utilized by the malware with the purpose of 
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keeping away from the signature detection of static scanning engines used in 
antivirus softwares. Therefore, the main function and purpose of the malware do not 
vary by this conversion, but all others may change. 
 In practice, metamorphic computer viruses effectively change some 
sequences of their instructions with syntactic or semantic corresponding instructions 
sequences, in consecutive offspring (Webster and Malcolm, 2006). Thus, although 
their code format actually looks different, the behaviors of all generations are similar. 
Typically, it is performed to prevent detection methods based on static analysis, 
which are normally used by antivirus software engines. Thus, static code scanning 
method to detect metamorphic viruses is not applicable; instead, heuristic analysis 
can be exploited to find unknown variants of a metamorphic virus.  
Several researches have deployed different techniques of machine learning to 
apply heuristic analysis in detection and classification of metamorphic viruses. One 
of the newest methods, which have achieved heuristic detection of metamorphic 
variants, is Hidden Markov Model (HMM), which is an appropriate technique in 
statistical pattern recognition. In the early 1970s, firstly HMM was applied to speech 
recognition problem (Rabiner, 1989). Until now, it has been used in many other 
areas, especially in biological sequence problems (Krogh, 1998). In recent years, 
many attempts are carried out to apply HMM in the problem of metamorphic virus 
detection. Wong and Stamp (2006) trained their models on disassembled executable 
codes of viruses. The pre-process of disassembly needs a lot of time and output of 
the process depends upon the capability of the disassembler. In (Attaluri et al., 2009), 
authors used profile HMM and applied the method to analyze the metamorphic 
variants. Their findings proved that Profile Hidden Markov Models is successfully 
applicable to model the virus families. However, she also performed the 
implementation on assembly source codes. Govindaraj (2008), tried to implement the 
HMM algorithm on PE files. She followed the same methodology of (Wong, 2006), 
but she extended it into code segment of Portable Executable files. 
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1.3 Problem Statement  
Since signature detection is the most commonly used detection strategy, virus 
writers have developed many techniques to evade such detection (Shanmugam et al., 
2013). Metamorphic computer viruses change their code as they spread, with the 
intention of preventing detection by static signature-based virus scanners 
(Konstantinou, 2008; Leder et al., 2009; Murad et al., 2010; Santos et al., 2010; You 
and Yim, 2010; Xu et al., 2013). In order to achieve this goal, metamorphic viruses 
employ different code mutation methods to contest intense static analysis (Tabish et 
al., 2009; Runwal et al., 2012). They are able to defeat dynamic analyzers, as well, 
when they sense they are running and examining in an environment, like an 
emulator, which is monitoring their behaviors (O'Kane et al., 2011). 
Detection of metamorphic computer viruses is not easy, because their authors 
have the knowledge of the feeblenesses of antivirus scanners. Static and dynamic 
analysis methods bring the limitations for antivirus scanners (Lee et al., 2011). 
Metamorphic and obfuscation techniques make virus finding by means of signature 
scanning practically impossible (Santos et al., 2010; Han et al., 2011b; O'Kane et al., 
2011; Toderici and Stamp 2012). To detect a metamorphic computer virus, some 
other more complicated techniques such as inspecting the structure of the file, testing 
the behavior of the program, or machine learning methods must be used (Desai and 
Stamp, 2010 ). In other words, antivirus software should use heuristic techniques 
rather than string scanning to analyze and detect this kind of viruses (Konstantinou, 
2008; Kasina et al., 2010). Given this situation, it is highly required that researchers 
in information security area make serious efforts in studying the metamorphism 
(Xufang et al., 2011). Today, a few researches are carried out to develop and 
implement new methods in order to improve the weakness of antivirus software‘s 
against the modern techniques which are exploited by metamorphic virus authors 
(Santos et al., 2011). In response to this concern, this study was set up to investigate 
this issue further.  
In this study, the following research questions will be answered:  
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1 What are the metamorphic computer viruses and their features? 
2 What are the metamorphic computer virus classification and detection 
methods? 
3 How metamorphic computer viruses can be reliably and effectively classified 
and detected? 
4 How to improve the existing classification and detection methods? 
5 How the performance of proposed model can be tested and evaluated? 
1.4 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to propose and develop an enhanced model to 
classify and detect metamorphic viruses in format of portable executable. The 
performance of proposed model would also be evaluated and justified. 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
The specific objectives of this study are:  
i. To investigate the metamorphic computer viruses and their features. 
ii. To analyze the existing metamorphic computer viruses classification and 
detection methods. 
iii. To propose a new model for metamorphic computer virus classification and 
detection. 
iv. To evaluate the performance of the proposed model. 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The result of this research presents a noticeable knowledge in the computer 
security and virology science area. In addition, the result of this study can be 
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exploited by antivirus software vendors. They can use the proposed model to 
improve antivirus products in defending against metamorphic computer viruses.  
1.7 Scope of the Study 
The focus of this study is on applying an enhanced form of Hidden Markov 
Model, particularly on the Portable Executable files. This study is to train the 
proposed model on the binary format of PEs, directly. The proposed model is applied 
on metamorphic virus family to involve the statistical features of the family. 
The metamorphic viruses chosen for the data set used in the experiments in 
this study include Next Generation Virus Creation Kit (NGVCK) virus family. The 
NGVCK virus family have been chosen, because based on the study done by Wong 
(Wong, 2006), the NGVCK virus family is able to create viruses that share only a 
few percent of similarity. It means the NGVCK is the most powerful morphing 
engine to create the metamorphic virus. 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
In Chapter 1, an introduction to digital security and computer virology is 
given. A brief description of the metamorphic computer virus is provided. The 
problem statement, purpose and objectives of the study are presented.  
In Chapter 2, a literature review on evolution of the computer virus 
concealment strategies, code obfuscation techniques, metamorphic computer virus 
detection techniques are given. In addition, some definitions of classification are 
introduced and Hidden Markov Model is explained, in details. In the last part of 
chapter 2, some of more related recent works are reviewed and gap of the study is 
presented. 
Chapter 3 begins with an introduction to different research paradigms, 
research framework, and research design. Then, the proposed method and its 
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evaluation are explained in details. At the end of chapter 3, instrumentation, 
assumptions and limitations of the study are presented.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the experimental design. This chapter contains 
experimental setup, feature extraction, data set and implementation of the model. 
In Chapter 5, the results of the experiments are given; the analysis of the 
proposed model and the threshold value are presented. Moreover, evaluation and 
justification of the proposed model based on a comparative study between the 
proposed model and four more related recent works are also given and discussed. 
The results of the proposed model are also compared with 44 famous commercial 
antiviruses.  
Chapter 6 contains discussion and conclusions. Finally, the contributions and 
importance of this study, and the some recommendations for the future studies are 
given. 
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